GANFER & SHORE, LLP

360 LEXINGTON AVENUE NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017

TELEPHONE (212) 922-9250 TELECOPIER (212) 922-9335

Mark A. Berman, Esq. Extension 266 E-mail: mberman@ganfershore.com

June 2, 2010

227202

BY FEDERAL EXPRESS

Cynthia T. Brown, Esq. Chief, Section of Administration Office of Proceedings Surface Transportation Board 395 "E" Street S.W. Washington, D.C. 20423-001 Office of Proceedings

Part of Public Record

Re:

MC-F 21035, Stage Group plc and Coach USA, Inc., et al.

Acquisition of Control – Twin America LLC

Dear Ms. Brown:

As you know, we represent Continental Guest Services Corporation ("CGSC") in connection with the above-referenced proceeding. I write in furtherance of our letter of May 28, 2010 in order to enclose a copy of the transcript of the oral argument held on May 27, 2010 (the "Transcript") in CGSC's state court antitrust action entitled Continental Guest Services Corp. v. International Bus Services, Inc., et al., Index No. 600643/10 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.) (the "State Action"), that is asserted against certain of the Applicants.

We note that conspicuous in its absence from the Transcript is any objection to CGSC's reference, description and/or use of Exhibit 1 to the Chan Declaration by certain of the Applicants' counsel, let alone any inference that such document is "confidential," even though parts of it were read into the record.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein and in our prior letters, it is respectfully submitted that the STB should consider the positions asserted by CGSC when ruling on the subject Application and deny Applicants' request to find that such document is confidential and to redact Exhibit 1 and all references to it from CGSC's papers when posting them on the STB's website.

Mark A. Berman

cc: David H. Coburn, Esq. (by federal express w/enclosure)
Karen Fleming, Esq. (by federal express w/ enclosure)
James Yoon, Esq. (by federal express w/ enclosure)

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

STATE OF NEW YORK)	
)	SS.
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)	

BELKIS MARTINEZ, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. I am over 18 years of age, am not a party to this action, and reside in New York State.
- 2. On the 2nd day of June, 2010, I served true copies of the within letter, with a copy of the transcript, from Mark A. Berman to Cynthia T. Brown, Esq., dated June 2, 2010, upon:

David H. Coburn, Esq. Steptoe & Johnson, LLP 1330 Connecticut Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036

Karen Fleming
Transport Workers Union of America
AFL-CIO, Local 225
10 Banta Place, Suite 108
Hackensack, New Jersey 07601.


James Yoon, Esq. 120 Broadway Suite 26C New York, New York 10271

3. Service was effectuated by delivering same to all of the above by Federal Express courier for standard overnight delivery, Airbill Nos. 8717 8319 5106, 8717 8319 5058 and 8717 8319 5069, respectively.

Sworn to before me this 2nd day of June, 2010

Notary Public, State of New York No. 02MC6117452

Qualified in New York County Commission Expires Oct. 25, 2008



WLK

1	
2	
3	PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER, LLP Attorneys for Defendant TWIN AMERICA
4	75 East 55th Street New York, New York 10022
5	BY: KENNETH M. BREEN, ESQ., and MICHAEL P. A. COHEN, ESQ., pro haec vice
6	SILLER WILK, LLP
7	Attorneys for "The Hotel" Defendants 675 Third Avenue
8	New York, New York 10017 BY: ALAN D. ZUCKERBROD, ESQ.
9	OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
10	Antitrust Bureau
11	120 Broadway, Suite 26C New York, New York 10271
12	BY: JAMES YOON, ESQ., Assistant Attorney General
13	
14	MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS
15	Reported By: William L. Kutsch
16	Senior Court Reporter
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	

1	Proceedings
2	THE COURT: Good morning.
3	MR. BERMAN: Good morning.
4	MR. COHEN: Good morning, your Honor.
5	MR. ZUCKERBROD: Good morning.
6	THE COURT: All right. These are defendants'
7	motions; correct?
8	MR. BERMAN: No, your Honor. It's plaintiff's
9	motion. It's the oral argument on the preliminary
10	injunction motion today as well as motions to dismiss.
11	THE COURT: So there are cross-motions.
12	MR. BREEN: Your Honor, before we start, there is
13	a pro haec vice motion that's pending with regard to Mr.
14	Cohen.
15	THE COURT: Do I have the paperwork here?
16	MR. BREEN: We submitted it in March. I could
17	hand it up.
18	THE COURT: Any opposition, your Honor.
19	MR. BERMAN: No.
20	THE COURT: Welcome to New York.
21	MR. PROVENZANO: Your Honor, Chris Provenzano for
22	IBS. We have a pro haec motion, as well.
23	THE COURT: Just make sure the paperwork gets to
24	me.
25	MR. BERMAN: No objection to that either.
26	THE COURT: Proceed.

MR. BERMAN: Your Honor, Mark Berman from the law firm of Ganfer & Shore, along with my associates --

THE COURT: You know what? Let's reverse the order. I know about the case. Let's hear the motion to dismiss, because if I'm going to dismiss the case, then let's get that out of the way.

Who wants to go first on the motion to dismiss?

MR. COHEN: Your Honor, Michael Cohen with Paul

Hastings law firm representing Twin America. And I will be presenting argument on the motion to dismiss.

THE COURT: Why don't you use the lectern. You can put your files up on the jury box.

MR. COHEN: Your Honor, part of our motion to dismiss is based on what we believe is a failure to plead irreparable harm with the injunctive relief. We will reserve that with the court's permission for the preliminary injunction motion.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. COHEN: And concentrate on what we think are unique to the motion to dismiss.

Judge, they made two representations initially in this case to obtain injunctive relief. The first was that they needed access to Twin America ticket vouchers in order to stay in business. And that's the irreparable harm issue that I'll separate out.

3

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Proceedings

The second representation that they made to this court was that the hotels are the primary method of distributing Twin America double-decker bus tour tickets. And the reason that they made that representation, Judge, is that it's key to their theory of the case, which is that there is nothing illegal about Twin America starting a concierge service unless it violates the Donnelly Act, and the only way it can violate the Donnelly Act is if it somehow resulted in Twin America being able to monopolize the double-decker bus market by locking out its competition.

In other words, if Twin America were to take over the hotel desks, it would lock out competition by not selling other entrants' tickets; therefore, be able to monopolize the market.

That fact, Judge, is fundamentally incorrect.

THE COURT: Well, but it's a fact. It's not an interpretation of the contract; is it? It's not a matter of statute or of common law. It's a fact.

This is a 3211 motion. I'm not supposed to be deciding facts on a 3211 motion.

MR. COHEN: Judge, it is a fact but it's a fact that's in the record and it's a fact that the court can certainly consider --

THE COURT: In your client's affidavits.

Proceedings

_

_

MR. COHEN: In the client's affidavits and in this court, Judge --

THE COURT: But this is a 3211 motion. You give me an impressive 3212 motion to dismiss for summary judgment, fine, but this is -- it's premature.

MR. COHEN: Judge, your Honor, in a normal circumstance, I'd see the point of the prematurity.

In this circumstance, we believe that under—3211(c) when you do have the affidavits in the record that show an uncontested fact, you can consider that fact and you can consider it in a summary judgment way.

At the very least, the Kaufman case indicates, Judge, that although we have put in a fact, if you will, an uncontested fact, it may change the standard ---

THE COURT: I lost count of how many factual affidavits there are in these motions.

MR. COHEN: Judge, this is one fact, one uncontested fact that is the central claim in the case.

And --

THE COURT: How can you say it's an uncontested fact? There is an allegation in the complaint. Are you saying that your argument is based upon the allegations in the complaint? No. Your argument is based upon allegations contained in your client's affidavit. The plaintiff has no obligation to contest that factual

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Proceedings

2

affidavit on a motion under 3211. None whatsoever.

MR. COHEN: What we are saying, Judge, is that the reason that we say it's uncontested is that it hasn't been contested in the complaint. It's not contrary to the complaint. The complaint alleges that this is the theory. The theory is, We will take over the hotel markets. has come to light in the record is that the hotel markets are a very small channel in this case. There is no way you can lock out competition.

THE COURT: I cannot decide a motion to dismiss based upon what you say are uncontested facts. There are no 19-a statements in a motion under 3211. I don't know what are contested facts. You can put an answer in tomorrow and the day after tomorrow move for summary judgment; that's not a problem. But -- and then you will have the right to say, Your Honor, this is uncontested, or it's contested only to a meaningless extent.

MR. COHEN: Let me be mindful of the court's time and the court's points.

THE COURT: Just be mindful of my reversal record.

MR. COHEN: Precisely. And let me take an approach that won't come close to the reversal side of the fence, and I will move away from the fact and save that fact for the preliminary injunction, as well.

THE COURT: Good.

26

1 Proceedings 2 MR. COHEN: Our motion to dismiss is based 3 essentially on three or four points, and I'll go through 4 them in order. The first and foremost point is the failure and 5 inability to allege a market in this case that we can 6 7 monopolize. And I will go back to -- the allegation in the 8 complaint is, in essence, that we can somehow take over 9 this hotel concierge market. 10 THE COURT: Isn't that sufficient by way of 11 allegation? 12 MR. COHEN: It's not sufficient, Judge, because 13 THE COURT: What do they have to allege? 14 MR. COHEN: They have to allege that that market is plausible. They have to allege that it's an antitrust 15 16 They have to allege that the hotel channel of market. 17 distribution is a unique market under antitrust rules by 18 reference to the rule of interchangeability and 19 cross-elasticity. 20 THE COURT: Let's assume you are right, and I give 21 them leave to replead, and they replead it. MR. COHEN: They can't plead it here, Judge. 22 23 THE COURT: Why not? 24 MR. COHEN: They can't plead it here because they 25 cannot plead and have not pled that New York City tourists 26 only purchase through the hotel channel. They have not --

Ū

Proceedings

THE COURT: Why can't they plead that? I didn't say why can't they prove it. Why can't they plead that?

MR. "COHEN: They haven't pled it, Judge, because -- well, they can't plead it for reasons that I won't get you --

THE COURT: I'm telling you, I can see this motion coming right back to me as a 3212 motion, but I'm really stymied by it. I was reading your briefs, nice logical arguments, and I said, Well, wait a minute, this is not a 3212 motion. I checked at the front. It's not.

MR. COHEN: So, Judge, let me back up then and talk about the 3211 pleading requirement and why it's important to make a pleading.

Why it is important to make a pleading? All too often in antitrust cases, all too often in antitrust cases, we get a plaintiff who comes up with a market that the Belford (phonetic) court called the proverbial -- what was it -- "red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man with a limp" market. They, in essence, defined the market so narrowly to create the appearance that there is something nefarious going on or that there is market power. And that does create -- if you could just plead that, that market, and get away with it, that creates an awful lot of complex commercial litigation over something that should never go forward.

And that's why the cases, Judge, say to plaintiffs, you know, at a pleading stage, at a motion to dismiss stage, you have to plead cross-elasticity and interchangeability. And I will define those concepts in a way that makes sense.

Proceedings

And the reason the courts do it is because they don't want these cases going forward over years for summary judgment when there was never a viable market in the first place; thus the interchangeability/cross-elasticity rule. What that means is, I'll take them both, but one first, interchangeability.

Interchangeability means that the plaintiff must allege all of the places and all of the substitutes for the product and then say why and where those substitutes end.

So, if it's an ice cream market, a plaintiff can't allege it's a vanilla ice cream market without alleging that there are other flavors of ice cream and types of ice cream and size of ice cream, and that's an example from the Menasha case that we put in our briefs.

Now I will move to cross-elasticity.

Cross-elasticity is defined in a market by movements in price. When you raise the price of a product, does it shift demand and purchases to substitute products. If so, those substitute products should be in the market.

The reason it's not just a pleading requirement is

ı

Proceedings

that without pleading cross-elasticity and interchangeability, you can't really go forward in an understandable way of what the antitrust claims are and shouldn't be permitted to proceed with those antitrust claims without first defining the market so you can define the effects.

So let me go back to the hotel distribution channel market that they have alleged, and I'm going to point you to a couple of cases that talk about why this matters on a motion to dismiss.

They have alleged hotel distribution. They have not alleged all of the other places that double-decker tour power bus tour passengers period can get their tickets. They haven't alleged -- and they know those, they know them, they haven't alleged that they get tickets at the visitors centers, they haven't alleged that they also get tickets on the street.

THE COURT: I do not recall how specifically, but do they allege these are the only outlets, the ones that you described they described in their complaint?

MR. COHEN: They actually do allege that there are other outlets. They do allege it. They do allege that there are other outlets. What they don't explain is why those other outlets are not interchangeable. Why are they not functional equivalents for a passenger to buy a ticket.

THE COURT: Well, do they have to explain or merely allege that they are not?

MR. COHEN: They have to allege that they are not. That's the critical point of making them plead a real market at this stage of a case, because, otherwise, you'd wind up with a fake case going forward for months on a market that gets overturned at the end of the day because it was defined arbitrarily and narrowly to plaintiff's own business rather than the entire marketplace where there were available products.

And in this case, the price of tickets is the same as every one of these markets -- every one of these distribution channels, so there is complete cross-elasticity across the distribution channels.

And they have, in fact, alleged --

THE COURT: Well, my recollection is that their description is that there are locations and there are locations, and not all locations are equal; that the industry is dominated by sales through certain locations, and it is that control of those locations that they say controls the market.

MR. COHEN: That is -- that's their allegation,

Judge. That is their allegation. But they have to -- they

do have to allege -- but they haven't alleged how much are

going through any of these channels. They haven't alleged

Proceedings

2 3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

any basis for their claim that the primary channel is hotels. And I understand, I can get into facts in the preliminary injunction side --

THE COURT: Under the Donnelly Act, how specific do they have to make these allegations? There is nothing in the CPLR that requires this kind of specificity? there something in the act?

There is something in the case law MR. COHEN: that requires it, Judge. There is not something in the This is a development of case law, and, of course, the Donnelly Act, as the court is well aware, is mirrored on the Sherman Act. In fact, it was one the few state statutes passed within years of the Sherman Act in 1898. It had a long history of parallel adoption of Sherman Act cases. And the Sherman Act, the Federal Court cases all go in this direction, as do some of the state court cases, that we have cited as well under the Donnelly Act.

The Laprosetti (phonetic) case in particular, that we cited to the court, adopts the rule of interchangeability and indicates and follows the federal precedent on this court.

THE COURT: What court was that?

The Laprosetti court was the New York MR. COHEN: Supreme Court; Judge.

THE COURT: What's the appellate division?

1	Proceedings
2	MR. COHEN: It was the Supreme Court, Kings
3	County, your Honor.
4	THE COURT: Nothing better than that? I'm sorry.
5	But it's I'm simply not bound by it. It's a coequal
6	court and it's not even in my Department.
7	MR. COHEN: Putting aside understood.
8	Understood, your Honor. That doesn't mean it's not right.
9	And it doesn't mean that it's not influential.
10	THE COURT: That means I've got to do some more
11	work.
12	MR. COHEN: And let me talk about the federal, the
13	two federal cases that matter here, your Honor, on this
14	issue, because the federal cases all make the point and
15	they are quite uniform.
16	The Supreme Court in the <u>Dupont</u> case first
17	announced the rule of interchangeability and
18	cross-elasticity that we have been discussing.
19	THE COURT: What authority, appellate authority do
20	we have in New York that adopts these two rules?
21	MR. COHEN: Judge, the only case that we have
22	cited under the Donnelly Act that talks about the rules of
23	law is the <u>Laprosetti</u> case.
24	The other cases that we cite are all federal cases
25	and we are relying on those federal cases.
26	THE COURT: Strike two.

Proceedings

MR. COHEN: Let me go back to my whiff, and I know it's gone by, but I would say, Judge, that the federal cases matter. The federal cases matter. They are interpreting --

THE COURT: I'm not saying that they don't, but we're dealing in a situation where the New York courts simply haven't ruled. They haven't. It's nice that somebody over in Brooklyn writes a decision, but I like to look at the Court of Appeals or at least the Appellate Division. It's a New York statute that's been on the books for over a hundred years.

MR. COHEN: It has, Judge. And these market definition issues have largely come through the federal cases.

THE COURT: All you've got to do is show me a nice Appellate Division, First Department, or Court of Appeals case saying that's the case in New York state, and I'm with you a hundred percent. I don't think it exists.

MR. COHEN: We'll try to follow up and find that case for the Judge.

Your Honor, if you would allow me, I would like to talk about one of the federal cases that's relatively recently kind of matters in this area.

THE COURT: No, I'm not -- I want to hear on the avocation for the preliminary injunction. Let's shift

Proceedings

gears now. The motion to dismiss is going no place.

MR. BERMAN: Your Honor, you know some of the facts already, but let me briefly go through them and let me go through the standards. What we must demonstrate are irreparable harm, likelihood of success on the merits, and balance of the equities.

My client is over a-hundred-year-old company.

What they do is they run concierge desks in hotels.

Presently, based on defendants' exhibits, they have desks in hotels that control about 45 percent of the New York

City market. They have changed what their basis is. Now it's 37 percent of the New York City market, the rooms in which my clients have desks. Ninety-five percent of my client's business is from the hotel desks.

We put in an affidavit, unrebutted, from a general manager of a hotel, the Holiday Inn, 600 rooms, a major player in the city, that says if my client is not able to appropriately be able to timely immediately sell the double-decker bus tour tickets, they take umbrage, they say this is not the number one tourist event concept in the city. It is. They give numbers. It's 45 million visitors in the city, they only sell a million-and-a-half, that's three to four percent. Three to four percent of one thing? It's huge. It is the number one, because unlike going to the Empire State Building where you are there for

20 minutes, you're on the double-decker bus all day as you

are visiting the city. This is the number one.

The Secala affidavit says, If you cannot be able to get me, my client, my customers, double-decker tour bus tickets, you're not full service, you're not compliance, you are effectively out of business.

Proceedings

This is my client's business. If we can't get the tickets, or if we can't get them timely and appropriately, we're done. We're gone.

This is not a commissions case, and it's not.

Commissions is, okay, you can calculate. We are out of business.

Now, interesting, unrebutted by the hotel defendants, who are in the same business as the gentleman GM of Holiday Inn, they put in an affidavit that says, You know, it's not the number one tourist attraction, you know, if a concierge can't sell this appropriately? We wouldn't terminate him.

Silence from the hotel defendants. They could have done something to say that this GM of the Holiday Inn is wrong. If we're out of business, that's irreparable harm. It's not a commissions issue. We wouldn't be here if it's a commissions issue.

You will hear from the other side, Oh, no, no, there are other ways of getting these tickets, and,

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Proceedings

2 therefore, how can we be out of business? They say we 3 should go run after one of the guys on the corner and say, Can we have a thousand tickets please for the people in the 4 5 hotel? Or we should go to the visitors -- one of their 6 visitors centers, 20 blocks away, which is like kiosks at 7 the zoo, you can say, Can I have one of these, one of 8 these, and one of these. My clients want professional, 9 high-end concierge desk, multilingual, your Honor, they 10 give advice, and they say, You know what? There is another You go on the Net and then buy the tickets. 11 12 the high-end concierge business. We have a desk the size perhaps of the jury box in various hotels. What they say 13 14 is, Do you know how you solve your problem? 15 16 17 18

By the way, I asked and you asked during the oral argument in March, Are you guys going to stop selling the tickets to my clients, you know, via the way you are doing it now? No answer. You read the affidavits now? don't say that. What they say is, Go knock yourself out. Go on the Net. So we should have everyone line up, my client should get, you know, ten terminals. That's not a concierge business. They want to make our concierge desks into a visitors center. There are no alternatives.

So the answer is, from an antitrust perspective you've heard on the motion to dismiss argument, I couldn't see anything more replete with facts.

1 Proceedings 2 THE COURT: What about using an Internet 3 connection with a printer? Can you print out the tickets immediately? 4 5 MR. BERMAN: So what would happen is, let's say I 6 have an Internet, so I do mberman -- Mark Berman -- at 7 CGSC -- ContinentalGuest.com -- you log onto CitySights, or 8 whatever, and --9 I come up. THE COURT: 10 MR. BERMAN: Judge Ramos comes up to the desk, exactly, Charles E. Ramos, your address, they type it in, 11 credit card number, put it in, all the other information --12 THE COURT: Or couldn't you have an account with 13 them, obtain the ticket and then sell the ticket to me? 14 15 MR. BERMAN: Well, what happens then is -- well, 16 let's say I do mberman because I'm the --THE COURT: Or the ticket comes out in the name of 17 18 the customer? 19 MR. BERMAN: Yes. So, but you need an Internet 20 connection. But let's say --21 THE COURT: If I'm going to ride the bus, I've got 22 to be me. 23 MR. BERMAN: Right. That's my understanding. 24 so, they log on, CitySights, or Gray Line gets the request, 25 Oh, it's at ContinentalGuest.com. We're not going to do 26 It's not their business. They want to put us out of

business. Once they see the domain name, CGSC.com, we're finished. We're done. They might say otherwise.

Well, the record, and you heard from counsel on the motion to dismiss that our pleadings are insufficient --

THE COURT: I'm thinking now in terms of how we can work this out so everybody goes home and leaves me alone.

If you have the ability and we have an agreement by everyone else to permit you to get these tickets online, have a printer available at your concierge disk, who doesn't have a computer these days?

MR. BERMAN: Your Honor, what happens is at the hotel, it's a desk about yea big, you have a lot of people, it's like going to the -- what will happen is, we don't do it the way they are doing it now, ends up being like the airport. You will have your long line, they will take all of your information, it will take bloody forever. And then the next thing you know, you know what? I'm done. I'm gone. It's a concierge business. We're not trying to open up a kiosk business. And if we can't do this job properly, we're not a full service. We're not trying to convert us into a visitors center. We are a high-end concierge business.

So from an irreparable harm point of view, it's

WLK

Proceedings

2

We are out of business. not a commissions case.

3 4

5

MR. BERMAN:

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18 19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

THE COURT: When your client sells theater tickets to someone, aren't those tickets generated by computer?

The theater tickets? Someone comes and says they want to see a theater, they come to the desk, and they will log in and see if it's available, and then they'll say, Go pick them up at the theater. So the answer is no, they will just say, Your name is waiting at the Broadhurst Theater, go pick it up.

So irreparable harm, we're not talking access. We're talking out of business.

THE COURT: After we're done today, you fellows are going to go to mediation because this case can be settled. I know it can.

> Continue. All right.

MR. BERMAN: So my -- first I have to establish irreparable harm. This is not a case where it's one line, if you will, your Honor. They cite to many cases where -which is a beer case, we're getting rid of the Schmidt's line, 23 percent. I have record evidence it puts us out of business. They don't have record evidence it doesn't put us out of business. So from a balancing of the equities, your Honor, there are no equities in their favor. Right now, we are servicing all the clients, all the hotels. We're doing a good job. Everybody is happy. The hotel

1 Proceedings 2 quests are getting serviced. The only thing from an equity 3 point of view is they want to go into our business. 4 very nice they want to go into our business, and they will lose a couple hundred thousand dollars, they've hired some 5 people, done some computer work. And the answer is, your 6 7 Honor, equities. Let's talk about the harm to the public. We have 8 9 sitting in the back of the room, your Honor, Assistant 10 Attorney General James Yoon. 11 THE COURT: I was going to ask, is the AG going to step in at all? 12 13 MR. BERMAN: He's back there. 14 MR. YOON: Good morning, your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Do we have your appearance on the record? 16 17 MR. YOON: No, your Honor. I was invited. We're 18 not a party to this case. 19 THE COURT: But before you speak, we have to know 20 who you are for the record. Give us a card. 21 MR. YOON: James Yoon, Assistant Attorney General, 22 Antitrust Bureau, New York State Attorney General's office. 23 THE COURT: My first question obviously is, is the 24 Attorney General's office going to intervene in this case? MR. YOON: At this moment we have no intention. 25 26 We have filed with the Surface Transportation Board.

not a party to this case.

THE COURT: I see. Thank you. Sorry.

MR. BERMAN: Anyway, since Mr. Yoon spoke about the Surface Transportation Board, just to review the bidding for your Honor, a month ago today, on April 27th, there was oral argument in Washington DC before the Surface Transportation Board, that was formerly the ICC, and before them is the issue of the approval of the combination of the two entities. Mr. Cohen spoke on behalf of the applicants, Mr. Yoon spoke on behalf of the Attorney General, and I also spoke on behalf of Continental Guest. No decision has been rendered at this point.

And, so right now, maybe the answer is up to you, your Honor, the preliminary injunction/TRO stays in effect until they rule, but if they do rule, they are either going to say the combination is appropriate, they are going to reject it, or they are going to put some conditions on it.

But a couple things are clear. Before the Surface Transportation Board is not the issue of the hotels. It's not the issue of the predicate for our claim, your Honor, which is that the reason this moves away from the equities, it moves more towards the likelihood of success on the merits. But the issue which is a predicate for our claim is that the reason why they are seeking to go into the concierge business is to protect their horizontal, almost

Proceedings

virtual monopoly in the double-decker tour bus industry.

While the Attorney General has raised the issue and has said barrier -- what's going on will create barrier venturing. Issue is not joined on our theory, if you will, that they are going into this vertical market in order, your Honor, in order to insulate and preserve their horizontal market. The case law, and it's in our brief, says that is inappropriate under the federal antitrust laws and, by analogy, the Donnelly Act. And it is true there are fewer antitrust cases reported under the Donnelly Act. But there is no issue that you can't, and it is a violation of the antitrust laws, whether you want to call it federal or state, to go into the vertical market in order to protect your horizontal market.

Now, the affidavit from the defendant says, your Honor, We didn't do it for that reason, we did it for economics, economy of scale, it's the right thing for us to do, we'll save money. Your Honor, I dispute that. We dispute that. And on a likelihood of success on the merits, that is our theory.

And we haven't had discovery in this case. I have sought discovery from the other side. There is no motion to stay in this courtroom. I have been here before. When they moved to dismiss, your ruling specifically says no.

And basically they said, Jump in the lake, we've made a

motion to dismiss, your complaint is frivolous, I'm not providing discovery. So, I am here now on oral argument on a preliminary injunction, having gotten no materials, the case law they allege and rely upon are all federal cases, after expedited discovery, and full preliminary injunction hearings. So what do I have to support my factual position that you should extend the TRO and say that there is a likelihood of success of a violation of the antitrust laws, monopolization, restraint of trade, and attempted monopolization.

Now, attempted is important because of course while they own the double-decker sightseeing tour bus market in New York, they are trying to get into the vertical concierge market. They cite a Second Department case that says there is no attempt at monopolization.

Your Honor, I've cited replete, five or six cases from the First Department and other courts that say attempted monopolization is a viable claim in New York. And indeed the precise wording of the Donnelly Act when you look at it, it is "or may be restrained." "...in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state or may be restrained." So the wording of the Donnelly Act says "may."

WLK

Except for the one Second Department case they

2 3

4 5

6

7

8 9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Proceedings

relied on, all the other cases say attempted monopolization is a viable claim.

Now, what do we have to prove on likelihood of success on the merits? We haven't gotten discovery. One document. How did we get this document? Mr. Yoon from the AG's office and the bus company defendants. There was a subpoena served. Apparently they agreed on some informal discovery. I'm not privy to that. Apparently -- and I don't know what went on, apparently there was a submission by the New York Attorney General for the Surface Transportation Board in confidential redacted form. was a skirmish in Washington about Mr. Yoon's submission, and the skirmish was decided presumably in favor of the Attorney General, and on their Website by the Attorney General, the Attorney General submission, came down their's in redacted form but with one exhibit. Okay. I pull it down, as I'm entitled to pull it down, and there is motion sequence 005 which is before your Honor next week saying I shouldn't have gotten that document, it should be sealed, it should be confidential.

I'll tell you about the one document I have, that they are very upset that I have, it says the following:

"Easier --" this is Exhibit C to our reply affidavit, last page:

"Easier decision-making as sole player in the

double-deck market."

Okay. I can go through the findings and conclusions of the AG's economic expert that goes through all the monopolization exactly, and I'm prepared to do that, but I tell you, your Honor, here is the one document that says sole player, double-deck. We win, there is a monopolization, done, over with horizontally.

Now, listen to this. "A combined entity will be better positioned to deal with a new market entrant."

Well, there it is. Your barrier of entry. When you read the papers after oral argument today, you're not going to see the words "barrier of entry" in the defendant's papers. That's not a good thing if they have gone into the vertical market to create a barrier of entry.

But, no, your Honor, we're wrong. We would never have done that for that reason. I say that's not true. I say I have one document to help us prove our case.

Let me give you our other hard evidence, if you will, that says they went into this vertical market to protect their horizontal market, which you're not allowed to do. The cases I've shown you said you're not allowed to do. They contest that predicate.

You want to know the fact? We have taped conversations with your client, and let me play them now, your Honor, admitting that's what they did.

1	Proceedings
2	THE COURT: If you have them in written form.
3	MR. BERMAN: Yes, I do. We are prepared to pass
4	out the transcript.
5	MR. COHEN: Your Honor, objection. We have never
6	seen this, heard this, they have never
7	MR. BERMAN: Absolutely not. They have never see
8	it or heard it, and their client said it.
9	MR. COHEN: None of this has ever been submitted
10	in the record, and we should have an opportunity to review
11	and understand where this is coming from. It's not even
12	admissible.
13	MR. BERMAN: We would have gotten it if we would
14	have had discovery and depositions. They violated this
15	court's rules.
16	THE COURT: You're not going to get depositions
17	until an answer is filed, but you do get documents.
18	Turn that off. Turn that off.
19	MR. COHEN: Judge, this has really gone too far.
20	If he had this information, he certainly could
21	have produced it before today.
22	THE COURT: Your objection is sustained. He
23	cannot submit anything that hasn't been submitted to the
24	other side.
25	If you want to have a hearing, and we can always
26	have a hearing, that will be one of your exhibits. That's

fine. But this is on a motion, no. We don't litigate motions by surprise.

MR. BERMAN: No, but what we do do is produce documents. What we do do is don't fight and hide documents and fight about the confidentiality of this document, and they are very upset I have it.

My burden, your Honor, is to show you success of the merits. I have admissions -- I'll pass out the transcript -- of what a representative of the defendants said, and what the key representative said is that they are doing this to secure the market. That's it. Over and out. So we have established, and that's why, your Honor, in all their cases, in all their cases, the federal cases, there are preliminary injunction hearings.

MR. COHEN: Your Honor, we're going to make the same objection. It's just more of the same. We don't know what this is, how it was obtained, where it came from. We have never seen it.

MR. BREEN: No authentication.

MR. BERMAN: The references are in the complaint.

Of course they're upset. I would be upset too, except they didn't have a right to do what they did on the documents.

MR. COHEN: Judge, this isn't a matter of being upset. It's just a matter of evidence.

THE COURT: If you want to make a motion to compel

_

_

Proceedings

them to -- and I hope we don't have to waste our time with that, to compel them to produce documents, that's one thing. If we need to have a hearing or further proceedings here, you can serve a copy of this transcript with whatever affidavit is necessary to make it something other than pure hearsay, fine. Someone has to identify it.

MR. BERMAN: It would be authentication. It wouldn't be hearsay because it's admissions by the clients.

THE COURT: Listening to a tape, I don't know who's speaking.

MR. COHEN: We object to that. We don't know if it's an admission. From what I've seen in this transcript, it doesn't appear to be us.

THE COURT: Just so we don't keep everyone, including the court, in complete suspense, who is speaking? Who are the two or more speakers on this telephone conversation?

MR. BERMAN: On four to five sound bites I was going to present to you, his name is Shimi Kluger. Shimi Kluger is a representative and cousin of Mark Marmurstein, principal of the defendants. In the fifth one, it's Mark Marmurstein himself.

MR. COHEN: Judge, that's incorrect with respect to the person they name as a representative. That person is not a representative of any of the bus defendants. And

1	Proceedings
2	we have no knowledge of what the heck he's talking about.
3	MR. BERMAN: He was sent as an emissary to talk to
4	my client.
5	MR. COHEN: Mr. Marmurstein is of course the
6	president and CEO of Twin America.
7	THE COURT: What I would suggest that you do is
8	make a copy of the tape available to the defendants if and
9	when they make a demand for it.
10	Why weren't documents or at least responses given?
11	MR. COHEN: Judge, may I remind the court, under
12	the initial schedule, there would not have been time for
13	discovery in this case in any event. We got a two-week
14	hearing turnaround.
15	THE COURT: I don't want to get into an argument
16	with you, but the CPLR makes it very clear, a document
17	demand can be served with a summons.
18	MR. COHEN: There were no document demands.
19	THE COURT: So there were none?
20	MR. COHEN: No.
21	MR. BERMAN: Not with the summons.
22	MR. COHEN: That's why I wanted to if I may,
23	Judge?
24	THE COURT: I'm just saying they can be.
25	Now, so time is not an issue now. Were document
26	demands served?

1	Proceedings
2	MR. BERMAN: Document demands were served, and the
3	form objection said, CitySights objects to the request on
4	the ground it was filed with a motion to dismiss, has
5	requested a stay of discovery, part of motion sequence 004,
6	not by order to show cause, but ordinary notice of motion.
7	THE COURT: Your documents are due
8	MR. BERMAN: This case lacks merit.
9	THE COURT: within seven days, five business
10	days. Get it done.
11	MR. COHEN: We will.
12	We also made other objections to the document
13	request with respect to the scope, time period, what they
14	were asking for
15	THE COURT: Those objections we can rule on so
16	long as those objections were timely served.
17	MR. COHEN: Indeed they were, Judge.
18	THE COURT: Then make the appropriate motion.
19	MR. BERMAN: On the hotel defendants, they didn't
20	respond.
21	THE COURT: Listen, fellows. It's nice to see yo
22	guys. We already spent an hour on this case. I'm not
23	unfamiliar with it.
24	The motion is marked submitted, both sides. The
25	TRO is continued.

MR. ZUCKERBROD: Your Honor, I represent the hotel

defendants, and I would like to be heard just briefly on our position.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ZUCKERBROD: Your Honor, Alan Zuckerbrod from the firm of Siller Wilk.

We also have a motion to dismiss the claims. There are two causes of action against the hotel defendants, one for breach of contract, one for unfair competition.

There are 11 hotel defendants, seven of whom have contracts, separate contracts, with the plaintiff in which the plaintiff is to provide concierge service. Those seven contracts provide the unquestionable right to terminate those contracts on our client's part without cause.

Notices were sent in a timely manner. Plaintiff has objected.

There were four other hotels that required cause. Notices of termination were sent for those. Those notices were rescinded.

There is no doubt that the hotel defendants should not be compelled, despite and whatever happened on the antitrust side, but the hotel defendants, because of their contractual rights, could not be compelled to be in business with the plaintiff if they choose not to do so.

It's not an issue of fact. It's an issue of plain language

of the contract.

So as a matter of law, we believe that the ninth cause of action for breach of contract can be dismissed and should be dismissed and, as a result, there is no likelihood of success, and no reason that the hotel defendants should be somehow enjoined to continue this relationship.

Secondly, on the injunction issue, clearly if there had been or was or is an improper breach of contract, that can be compensated in terms of monetary damages.

Again, no right to an injunction against the hotel defendants. We believe the contracts are clear and allow for their dismissal.

There is a second, another cause of action for unfair competition. It's pleaded very vaguely. We incorporated by reference some of the arguments that the bus company defendants made in their motion as to why that claim should be dismissed. Plaintiff came back and said, Well, you don't have to -- and in our arguments, we said there is no unfair competition, it's an antiquated cause of action that requires misappropriation and palming off.

CGS came back and said, Well, you don't really need misappropriation, there is a cause of action. They cited a case that your Honor decided five years ago called the Lewis Capital Markets case which they discuss in their

brief and we discuss in our reply. And that case, in fact, says -- that was a case involving corporate espionage and a mole, and that case clearly says, Because they were stealing, misappropriation, there is a viable claim for unfair competition.

Here, the hotel defendants have not stolen anything. All they have done is sought to exercise their right to terminate their contract. I submit that whatever happens on the antitrust side, we're getting sucked up in something where we don't belong, and the hotel defendants should be dismissed from this case.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. COHEN: Judge, I do have one thing to add.

It's very, very important to the form of the relief or the TRO that you continued.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. COHEN: If I may?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. COHEN: I want you to -- in order to understand this, Judge, I would like to hand up what it is that the plaintiffs distribute, what they say they need, the access to these tickets, so that you can see. It's a voucher. I will be very direct and very quick, Judge, as to the form of the relief.

THE COURT: What's the problem? Articulate it

please.

MR. COHEN: The basic problem is this, Judge. The TRO that they have obtained goes well beyond the relief they have stated is irreparable. They say that they need access to these ticket vouchers in order to distribute these ticket vouchers to their hotel guests. Your Honor picked up on the fact that these ticket vouchers are the very same that they could print out from the Internet.

But without even going there, what they are not entitled to, Judge, is a commission. They can have these ticket vouchers to their heart's delight, but they should have to pay us full price for them, just like anybody else that works from the Internet, or anybody else that would come to us for them.

The TRO should not be that broad as to interfere with or impose an obligation on us to actually pay them a 35 percent fee to distribute these vouchers. That access remedy would completely solve any preliminary harm in this case, they could go on competing, we could enter the market and ourselves compete --

THE COURT: He's got a good point.

MR. COHEN: -- and everybody will have access to the tickets.

THE COURT: He has a good point.

MR. BERMAN: Your Honor, the commission that they

pay us, it's not a commission. This is not a commission issue. The reason is, we go on -- we talked about it before, what we would need to do is go put down ten terminals, and each of these --

MR. COHEN: Judge, I'm saying they could have this, just what they have now, what they have, but they have to pay us for it. And then we should be allowed to enter the market, everybody has access to the same tickets, there can be no irreparable harm.

MR. BERMAN: They shouldn't be allowed to enter the concierge desk market pending your decision because what they are doing is going into the concierge market to protect their horizontal.

MR. COHEN: No.

MR. BERMAN: That is not permissible because --

THE COURT: Articulate both of your positions in letters, get them to me by Monday, and I will consider a modification of the Temporary Restraining Order.

MR. BERMAN: Your Honor, we have the TRO in place. The preliminary injunction was slightly broader than the TRO.

THE COURT: I'm not granting the preliminary injunction now.

This is submitted. The TRO is continued, and I will consider the modification. You get letters to me,

1	Proceedings
2	serve each other, and get me a package.
3	MR. BERMAN: Can we do it on Tuesday since Monday
4	is a holiday?
5	THE COURT: Yes, fine. I won't be here.
6	MR. BERMAN: How long? Are there any page
7	limitations?
8	THE COURT: No page limitation. Do your \$10,000
9	letter. I don't care.
10	MR. COHEN: I'm going to do less than that, Judge,
11	and I will leave you with the voucher if you would like,
12	Judge, to make it clear.
13	THE COURT: I get car sick on busses.
14	Thank you very much.
15	(At this time the proceedings were concluded.)
16	-000-
17	CERTIFICATION
18	This is to certify the within is a true and
19	accurate transcript of the proceedings as reported by me.
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	William L. Kutsch, SCR
25 26	
ZO I	